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Professionalism in science
In everyday speech, the word “professional” has an
ambiguous ring, applied to one who follows, by way of
profession, what is ordinarily regarded as a pastime (e.g.,
a sport), or disparagingly applied to one who “makes a
trade” of politics and the like. In this sense it is contrasted
with “amateur”, one who does something, literally, for the
love of it, without remuneration. The latter is generally
regarded as superior to the former; remuneration being
considered as likely to irremeably invest the activity with
self-interest, resulting in the task at hand being merely
accomplished with the minimally sufficient expertise and
skill to obtain the offered remuneration, whereas the
amateur strives to do whatever task is at hand as well as
he or she possibly can, “ excellence for its own sake”.
In parallel, since 1793 “professional” has also meant
“engaged in, or belonging to, one of the learned or skilled
professions.” Since membership of a profession is usually
connected with membership of a society with strict
entrance requirements, in this sense “professional”
means roughly the opposite of the everyday meaning,
namely it implies a stamp of quality, a guarantee of a
certain (high) standard of workmanship, whereas
“amateur” implies a mere dilettante or dabbler. Before
their union to form the Royal Society of Chemistry in
1980, the Chemical Society existed for amateurs, and the
Royal Institute of Chemistry, regarded as far more
prestigious than the Chemical Society, existed for
professional chemists.1 It was furthermore realized that
since one needs to be remunerated in order to live,
remuneration in itself need not distort the goal of supreme
quality inherent in undertaking any work.2
Professionalism has some interesting implications
for the work carried out at universities, many of which
are now eager to accept industrial research contracts.
Traditionally, as in the Soviet research institutes
belonging to the Academy of Sciences, or in the French
Centre Nationale de la Recherche Scientifique
(CNRS), scientists joined their institute through a
competitive admissions procedure and for the rest of
their lives did not have to worry about remuneration. It
was up to them to determine what were the most
suitable topics to work on, and since it is part of the
ethos of science inculcated in young scientists during
their undergraduate education that one should work on
important problems that are also likely to be useful to
society, the system was, in principle, one that effectively
prevented irrelevant work from being carried out, and
could be said to be socially useful, building up knowledge
for advancing human civilization.
In these countries, however (and in others such as
the United Kingdom, where a similar rôle was played by
the universities), this mode of organization has now
changed (typically brought about by severe reductions
in the public funds allocated to financing institutes or
universities) and nowadays the scientist is largely
responsible for bringing in the funds to support his or her
work, preferably from external sources such as
industries. Hence, the mode of working has become
more akin to that of other liberal professions such as
law or surveying, in which work is undertaken for a fee.
The transformation has been, on the whole, a
gradual one, which is perhaps why this new mode of
working has become established without any real debate
about its merits and implications. Donald Denman, who
upon retirement from his Cambridge professorship
continued professional work through accepting commis-
sions and consultancies, found the transition very
difficult. “Truth, as one saw it [in academic life], was
outspoken and expectant of contradiction, confrontation,
rebuttal, denunciation and criticism. Words were not
trimmed nor ideas double-thought. Straight flung speech
was never considered impolite. The professional world,
on the contrary, appeared to confuse politeness with
deference. The shopkeeper’s code, the customer is
always right, was the aphorism to work by. Should a
principal or client wish to think that black is white, don’t
disillusion him—you might lose a fee! What the French
called prévenance held precedence over a hammered-
out truth.”3 The dilemma that this poses the academic
working with industry when the continuing existence of
the academic work group depends on continuing
industrial contracts seems never to have been properly
addressed.
1 In the beginning, of course, before the profession existed as such, all chemists were amateurs.
2 Sport has similarly become “officially” professionalized, but since it is indubitably, by its inherent nature, a pastime the
professionalism is presumably justified by the fact that spectator sport has become a very large and lucrative industry. Within
sporting circles, the debate has been rather acrimonious. The Marylebone Cricket Club, founded in 1787, long upheld amateur
status, only abolishing it in 1962. The Rugby Football Union (formed in 1871) removed all restrictions on payments in 1995. The
Wimbledon lawn tennis championship, which started in 1877, became “open” in 1968. The Olympic Games, refounded in 1896 in
Athens, accepted professional athletes in all sports in 1992. Some people maintain that the events as a spectacle have become
more exciting and interesting as a result, but others perceive the opposite; this is evidently a rather subjective matter.
3 Denman, D.R. A Half and Half Affair, p. 315. London: Churchill Press (1993).
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The obvious danger is, of course, that truth will no
longer be hammered out, since everyone will be too busy
earning their fees. Uniquely among the professions,
scientists have always worked with that implacable and
immutable arbiter, nature, and have always had the
confidence that erroneous ideas will, sooner or later, fail
the test of hard experiment. This ethos has served
science well for many hundreds of years. But as things
become more complicated, designing a direct experiment
to test an idea becomes more difficult, and it seems
already now to be possible to construct large zones of
stability, upon which further construction may take place,
while the whole rests upon an initially unsuspected
fallacy. Hence, hammering out truths has become more
vitally important than ever before, yet professional
pressures cause it to be done ever more seldom. This
trend severely erodes the reputation of scientists as
objective, independent thinkers.
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